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A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Dressing-Up Substantive
Legislation to Trigger the Interpretive Exception to
Retroactivity Violates Constitutional Principles
A Wolf found great difficulty in getting at the sheep owing
to the vigilance of the shepherd and his dogs. But one day
it found the skin of a sheep that had been flayed and thrown
aside, so it put it on over its own pelt and strolled down
among the sheep. The Lamb that belonged to the sheep,
whose skin the Wolf was wearing, began to follow the
Wolf in the Sheep's clothing; so, leading the Lamb a little
apart, he soon made a meal off her, and for some time he
succeeded in deceiving the sheep, and enjoying hearty
meals. Appearances are deceptive.
Despite jurisprudential efforts to protect the interpretive
exception to retroactivity from legislative abuse, pronged tests and
checklists cannot prevent attempts to squeeze substantive
legislation into the law under the guise of interpretive legislation.
The trappings of retroactive application that follow interpretive
classification present an apparently irresistible opportunity to
create substantive law that could receive such desirable effects
with a mere moniker. Retroactive application of substantive law,
even if it is presented as interpretive, impinges upon the judicial
role of interpretation and violates constitutional principles.
I. INTRODUCTION
Louisiana modifies the rule against retroactive legislation with
a civilian exception. Instead of universally prohibiting retroactive
legislation, Louisiana grants a special exception for interpretive
legislation.2 This exception recognizes that interpretive legislation
Copyright 2007, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Aesop, The Wolf in Sheep's Clothing, in AESOP'S FABLES 102-03
(Thomas James & George Tyler Townsend trans., The Franklin Library 1982),
available at http://www.pagebypagebooks.com/Aesop/AesopsFables/The_
Wolf inSheepsClothing.pl.html.
2. LA. Cwv. CODE ANN. art. 6 (2006) ("In the absence of contrary
legislative expression, substantive laws apply prospectively only. Procedural
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is not "new" legislation as it merely explains or clarifies prior law.
As such, retroactive application of interpretive legislation simply
applies the original law.
Recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court has found the
interpretive exception to the rule against retroactivity to be
unconstitutional in certain circumstances. 3 The reasoning behind
the ruling is fundamental: because the Louisiana Constitution
specifically entrusts the judiciary with the authority to interpret the
laws, nominally "interpretive" legislation promulgated by the
legislature violates separation of powers when the legislation is
truly substantive. a The legislative branch may not exceed its
power by affixing an interpretive label on substantive legislation to
trigger the exception to retroactivity.
5
Retroactive laws undermine the ability of'citizens to rely on
their rights. However, the policy of encouraging such reliance
does not justify casual disregard for this deep-rooted civilian
exception. While the legislature should not usurp the judiciary's
interpretive power, the interpretive exception should not be
arbitrarily dismissed through judicial ruling. The interpretive
exception to retroactivity should remain a component of Louisiana
law since it is a recognized pillar of the civilian tradition.
This article demonstrates improved classification methods for
interpretive and substantive legislation to allow proper
characterization and prevent constitutional violations. To develop
this classification scheme, Part II examines the evolution of the
interpretive legislation exception to the rule against retroactivity by
reviewing the policy considerations that have concerned
and interpretative laws apply both prospectively and retroactively, unless there
is a legislative expression to the contrary.").
3. Unwired Telecom Corp. v. Parish of Calcasieu, 903 So. 2d 392 (La.
2005) (on rehearing). The scope of this analysis does not encompass the
retroactive effect of judicial opinions, which receive a different classification
determination. See Lovell v. Lovell, 378 So. 2d 418, 421-22 (La. 1979). This
comment will focus on the problems associated with the classification and
retroactive application of legislative enactments.
4. LA. CONST. art. V, § 1 (defining judicial power); LA. CONST. art. II, § 2
(explaining that no branch may exercise the power of any other).
5. Id. art. II, § 2.
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lawmakers and judicial figures when drafting and applying the
controlling provisions. Part III derives a framework of
characteristics for an accurate distinction between substantive and
interpretive legislation so that temporal effects are constitutionally
applied. Finally, Part IV concludes the analysis by considering the
constitutional benefits and ramifications resulting from a clarified
sorting scheme.
II. BACKGROUND: RECOGNIZING CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS AND
UNCOVERING THE REASONING BEHIND EXISTING CLASSIFICATION
POLICIES
The interpretive exception violates due process and separation
of powers principles when it is used to slip substantive law through
6the legislative cracks so that it may receive retroactive application.
A. Legislative Abuse: Constitutional Consequences
Governmental powers are compartmentalized so that each
branch of government derives power from a different article of the
Constitution.7 This discrete demarcation of authority allows
execution of governmental power as the Framers intended since
each branch has a specific and complementary role. In accordance
with the United States Constitution, the Louisiana Constitution
also follows the principle of separation of powers.8 The executive
branch has the power to carry out the law.9 The judicial branch has
the exclusive authority to interpret the law by applying it to
individuals.' 0 The legislative branch has the sole authority to write
6. Unwired Telecom, 903 So. 2d at 404.
7. See U.S. CONST. arts. I-Ill.
8. LA. CONST. art. II, § 2 ("Except as otherwise provided by this
constitution, no one of these branches, nor any person holding office in one of
them, shall exercise power belonging to either of the others.").
9. U.S. CONST. art. II.
10. Id. art. III; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound
and interpret that rule."); Francis Bacon, Of Judicature, in 12 THE WORKS OF
FRANCIs BACON 265 (James Spedding et al. eds., 1900) ("Judges ought to
2007]
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the legislation that becomes law." Within this penumbra of
authority, the legislature may pass interpretive legislation, which
clarifies the meaning of an original law 12 and, thus, applies
retroactively.' 3 Since the legislature only has the limited authority
to elucidate previously enacted laws, legislation labeled
"interpretive" can infringe on judicial powers when used to
adjudicate a case' 4 or alter existing rights and duties.' 5
B. The Civilian Exception: French Foundation of Louisiana
Tradition
The interpretive exception to the rule against retroactivity is a
long-standing component of the civilian tradition.16 As a civilian
jurisdiction in comparative infancy, Louisiana was heavily
influenced by French laws. 17 Accordingly, the addition of the
interpretive exception in Louisiana law reflects the French civil
law exception to retroactivity for interpretive legislation. 18 French
scholarly doctrine illustrates the utility and importance of the
remember that their office is jus dicere, and not jus dare; to interpret law, and
not to make law, or give law.").
11. U.S. CONST. art. I; LA. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The legislative power of
the state is vested in a legislature . . . ."); P. Raymond Lamonica & Jerry G.
Jones, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2. 1, in 20 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 6, 10 (2004) ("'Legislative power' is primarily the power to make
laws.").
12. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 6 cmt. (d) (2006); Marcel Planiol, 1 CIVIL LAW
TREATISE No. 251 (La. State Law Inst. trans., 1959) (1939).
13. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 6 (2006).
14. Unwired Telecom Corp. v. Parish of Calcasieu, 903 So. 2d 392, 404-05
(La. 2005) (on rehearing).
15. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609 So. 2d 809, 820 (La.
1992). Legislative power is abused when it is used to give "the name of
'interpretive law' to laws which. contain new provisions." Planiol, supra note 12.
16. The interpretive exception to retroactive application is codified in article
6 of the Louisiana Civil Code. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 6 (2006). Article 6
"reproduces the substance of Article 8 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 and
accords with Louisiana jurisprudence interpreting the source provision. It does
not change the law." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 6 cmt. (a) (2006).
17. J.-R. Trahan, The Continuing Influence of le Droit Civil and el Derecho
Civil in the Private Law of Louisiana, 63 LA. L. REV. 1019, 1026-36 (2003).
18. Louisiana laws reflect their French counterpart. Id. at 1052.
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interpretive exception as a civilian and, thus, a Louisiana
tradition.' 9
In one of the earliest examples of retroactive legislation, the
French legislature passed new successions laws immediately after
the French Revolution to instill parity into French law.20  To
expedite the absorption of the laws in response to demands of
social equality, the laws were retroactively applied to all
successions in the last five years-including settled and partitioned
successions. 21  Today, the U.S. Constitution protects against the
retroactive alteration or creation of rights.22 Nevertheless, the
rudimentary historical reasoning behind retroactivity remains
current with modem policy: when legislation fixes itself to
represent the "correct" law, it should apply retroactively. 23
As one author elucidates, the interpretive exception satisfies an
important function of the Louisiana legal system and "can
potentially affect any substantive area of the law and any number
of rights . . 24 The all-encompassing consequences of temporal
effects emphasize the necessity of proper application for every area
of substantive law. According to French scholarly doctrine,
interpretive legislation indicates the law's original purpose with
precision and applies retroactively "to resolve difficulties
concerning acts and effects accomplished before their
promulgation and under the dominion of the interpreted law."25 As
a component of our civilian tradition, the interpretive exception
should be preserved in the law with integrity, avoiding legislative
exploitation.
19. Gabriel Marty & Pierre Raynaud, 1 DROIT CIVIL: INTRODUCTION
GENERALE A L'ETUDE DU DROiT 107, 192 (J.-R. Trahan trans., 1998) (2d ed.
1972).
20. Planiol, supra note 12.
21. Id.
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, and U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
(legislative power is limited by due process). See also LA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
23. In compliance with constitutional principles, interpretive laws should
receive retroactive application only when they do not impermissibly alter a
vested right. See infra Part III for a detailed discussion.
24. Jackie M. McCreary, Comment, Retroactivity of Laws: An Illustration
of Intertemporal Conflicts Law Issues Through the Revised Civil Code Articles
on Disinherison, 62 LA. L. REV. 1321, 1349 (2002).
25. Marty & Raynaud, supra note 19, at 192.
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C. Existing Legal Regime: Classification Rules and Judicial
Techniques
Louisiana Civil Code article 6 states: "In the absence of
contrary legislative expression, substantive laws apply
prospectively only. Procedural and interpretative laws apply both
prospectively and retroactively, unless there is a legislative
expression to the contrary." 26 Even though article 6 contains a
reservation for retroactive application of substantive law upon an
expression of legislative intent, such application must comply with
constitutional principles.27
The general rule against retroactivity binds substantive laws,
but grants an exception for interpretive legislation. Laws receiving
retroactive application affect new cases and those that are not
causae finitae (extinguished causes).28 Civilian scholars explain
retroactive restrictions as follows: "One can justify this solution by
the idea ... that the trouble born by a retroactive law will be all the
more grave as it will revive difficulties born from the opposition of
interests that have been definitively settled.. 29 Once concluded, an
issue should not be disrupted-despite subsequent changes in the
law. Final judgments should be upheld in the interest of
discouraging unnecessary litigation and protecting the parties'
established reliance on the resolved rule. Delicate application of
retroactive laws in accordance with these principles prevents due
process violations and preserves their beneficial function.
26. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 6 (2006). Procedural legislation also receives
retroactive application, but it is beyond the scope of this comment. LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 1:2 (2003) (proscribing retroactive application of any section of
the revised statutes unless such application is expressly stated).
27. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land and preempts any laws
that breach its principles. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. Thus, a law cannot be
applied retroactively, despite legislative intention reserved by article 6, if that
application violates constitutional principles.
28. Kenneth M. Murchison & J.-R. Trahan, WESTERN LEGAL TRADITIONS
AND SYSTEMS: LOUISIANA IMPACT 227 (rev. ed. 2003) (citing Patrice Level,
ESSAI SUR LES CONFLITS DE LOIS DANS LE TEMPS 33 n.19, 161-62 n.90 (J.-R.
Trahan trans., 1999) (1959)) (a matter is causae finitae when it receives





Legislative interpretation under article 6 requires a two-part
inquiry: (1) has the legislature commanded retrospective or only
prospective application; and (2) if not, is the law substantive,
procedural, or interpretive? 30 Thus, the initial step in classification
determines and defers to expressed legislative intent for temporal
application. 31 Statutory construction indicates the lawmaker's
original objectives for the forthcoming law.32 Express legislative
declaration on the intended temporal application of a law
simplifies classification. When the legislature does not clearly
express temporal desires, a court must closely read the language of
the law to infer its implied classification and corresponding effects.
A common law scholar, noted for studies of statutory construction,
explains that future tense words "such as 'shall' or 'hereafter"'
indicate prospective application, while the past tense "such as 'has
been' or 'heretofore' clearly signifies retrospective application.
33
Despite these seemingly simple inferences, conflicting opinions
regarding legislative intent complicate the classification process.34
30. Pierce v. Hobart Corp., 939 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1991).
31. Reichert v. State, 694 So. 2d 193, 199 (La. 1997). See generally
Frangois Gdny, METHODE D'INTERPRETATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIvt
POSITIF (La. State Law Inst. trans., 2d ed. 1954).
32. Dumas v. State, 828 So. 2d 530, 536 (La. 2002) ("[T]he starting point
for the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself."). See
also Josef Kohler, Judicial Interpretation of Enacted Law, in SCIENCE OF LEGAL
METHOD 187-201 (Ernest Bruncken & Layton B. Register trans., Sentry Press
1969) (1917) (explaining reasons and methods of legal interpretation).
33. F. McCaffrey, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 65 (1953) (quoting Black,
CONSTRUCTION & INTERPRETATION OF LAWS (2d ed. 1911)). Although
McCaffrey is not a civilian scholar, his work on statutory construction equally
applies to civilian jurisdictions. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith,
609 So. 2d 809, 817 (La. 1992) (using McCaffrey's rules to determine that a
delayed effective date is evidence of intent for prospective application);
Simmesport State Bank v. Scallan, 134 So. 2d 391, 394 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961)
(citing McCaffrey's rules to forgo interpretation when the statutory language is
clear).
34. See, e.g., Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr. v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales & Use
Tax Comm'n, 903 So. 2d 1071, 1085-86 (La. 2005) (discussing the difficulty in
determining legislative intention and concluding that learned scholars disagree
on the relationship between the two paragraphs of article 466, namely, whether
the legislature intended them to be read disjunctively or inter-dependently).
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Determinable legislative intent for temporal application that does
not constitute a constitutional violation completes the classification
inquiry, but uncertain or unconstitutional legislative intent
necessitates further analysis.35
2. Interpretive or Substantive?: Applying Jurisprudential Tests
When legislative intent is not apparent, courts must use
circumstantial evidence to infer legislative intent regarding
temporal effect. 36  Judicial analysis of legislation classification
often produces learned discussion and well-intended remedies.
37
Unfortunately, the inherently subjective analysis by different
judges reveals the ambiguity and insufficiency of existing tests.38
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Smith developed an
oft-cited39 and equally criticized 4° test to resolve a workers'
compensation claim involving the alteration of a pertinent statute.4'
In an established line of cases, courts had interpreted workers'
compensation laws to grant employers priority in the receipt of
third party damage awards only for an employee's lost wages or
medical expenses, and not for other damages, such as pain and
suffering. In contravention of judicial interpretation, subsequent
35. Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 783 So. 2d 1251, 1258 (La. 2001).
36. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 10 (2006); Pierce v. Hobart Corp., 939
F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1991).
37. St. Paul, 609 So. 2d 809.
38. J.-R. Trahan, Time for a Change: A Call to Reform Louisiana's
Intertemporal Conflicts Law (Law of Retroactivity of Laws), 59 LA. L. REV. 661,
759 (1999) (describing conflicting conclusions of the judges on the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Chance v. American Honda Motor Co., 635 So. 2d 177 (La.
1994)). "Both the plurality and the concurring minority were able, evidently in
good faith, to justify their respective characterization determinations by
reference to one definition or the other. It would seem, then, that even in
practice the line between the two categories is hopelessly blurred." Id.
39. Unwired Telecom Corp. v. Parish of Calcasieu, 903 So. 2d 392, 403
(La. 2005) (on rehearing); Segura v. Frank, 630 So. 2d 714, 723 (La. 1994);
Bourgeois, 783 So. 2d at 1257.
40. Trahan, supra note 38, at 760-62 (asserting that the factors are
ambiguous, circular, and insufficient).
41. St. Paul, 609 So. 2d at 819 (candidly admitting that the distinction
between substantive and interpretive legislation is indistinct).
42. Id. at 811-13.
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legislation allowed the employer first-payment rights from all of
an employee's damage awards, including awards for pain and
suffering.4 3 Although lower courts allowed retroactive application
of the new law, the St. Paul court found that the legislative
alteration impermissibly targeted a judicial decision by overruling
existing law and changing workers' compensation payment
allocation.44
Despite inherent ambiguities, the. four-pronged St. Paul test
contributed clarity to the murky waters of classification. First, the
court considered the amount of time that elapsed between an
"incorrect" judicial interpretation and the proposed legislative
"remedy." Although a close temporal relationship between a piece
of legislation and a prior case does not automatically indicate
interpretive legislation, 45 an inference of retroactive legislative
intent may arise from a timely and deliberate legislative response.
A two-year legislative waiting period before rendering
interpretation, as in St. Paul, is presumed to produce a substantive
change.46 In contrast, legislative response within two months and
four days after the original ruling has been termed "swift and
overwhelming. ' 47  Accordingly, two months is a sufficiently
prompt response to infer interpretive motive, while two years
allows stagnancy to corrupt suggestions of intent to interpret.
The second prong of the St. Paul test measures the extent to
which the contested subject matter is embedded in the law: does
the legislation affect a "single decision" or an "established line of
jurisprudence? 48 Law becomes settled over time as more cases
are decided and reliance upon the particular law increases. Well-
settled law is characterized by the number of appellate and federal
43. Id. at 813-14.
44. Id. at 810.
45. Id. at 820.
46. See id.
47. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr. v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales & Use Tax
Comm'n, 903 So. 2d 1071, 1108 (La. 2005) (on rehearing) (Weimer, J.,
assigning additional reasons). Willis-Knighton was decided on April 1, 2005;
legislative response was introduced on April 25, 2005, and enacted on June 29,
2005. See 2005 La. Acts No. 301, § 1.
48. St. Paul, 609 So. 2d at 820.
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cases that apply the rule in question.4 9 Legislation that concisely
affects a single decision is more likely to be interpretive law than
are attempts to redefine a governing law that has been repeatedly
affirmed.
Third, the St. Paul test considers a party's reliance on the
established rule as revealing interpretive or substantive effects.
50
For example, when parties agree to a stipulation about the very rule
they later contest, their reliance on the rule in question indicates an
understanding that the rule is settled.51 Accordingly, legislation
that alters the rules and changes relied upon rights is substantive
law and only receives prospective application. In pursuit of just
classification, individual circumstances should be considered
before temporal effects are blindly administered.
As the final prong of the St. Paul test, the amount of legislative
interpretation at issue should be considered: does the contested
legislation revise a single law, or is it part of a blanket revision on
an entire collection of doctrines? 52 For instance, in St. Paul, the
legislature amended several sections of the Louisiana Workers'
Compensation Law, not just the contested statute.53 This broad
amendment suggests that the legislature was making substantive
changes, not an isolated correction. If the legislature truly intends
clarification of the existing law, and not creation or alteration of
rights and duties, interpretive legislation would more likely be
dispensed in individual circumstances, rather than cranked out in
legislative overhaul.
Virtually all subsequent jurisprudence considering retroactivity
cites the St. Paul test,54 but the test has not been closely followed
and unquestioningly adopted. Courts have alternated between
flexible and bright-line solutions to temporal application
49. Id. ("[L]egislation that changes settled law falls outside of [the
interpretive] category.").
50. Id. at 820-21.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 821.
53. Id.
54. Unwired Telecom Corp. v. Parish of Calcasieu, 903 So. 2d 392, 403
(La. 2005) (on rehearing); Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 783 So. 2d
1251, 1257 (La. 2001); Segura v. Frank, 630 So. 2d 714, 723 (La. 1994).
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problems.5 5 For example, in Segura v. Frank, the court found that
new legislation requiring a plaintiff to exhaust uninsured motorist
("UM") coverage before proceeding against the Louisiana
Insurance Guaranty Association ("LIGA") substantively amended
the law that formerly allowed immediate action against LIGA.
56
The court addressed the St. Paul test, but only used parts of the
analysis to reach its conclusion.57 The court considered the
alteration of a UM carrier's rights and obligations for pending
claims, the settled nature of the law by a decade of consistent
interpretation allowing immediate action against LIGA, and the
systemic amendment of other UM laws. 58 Thus, the analysis in the
Segura decision adopted a hybrid classification approach; it
examined the alteration of vested rights and evaluated the second
and fourth prongs of the St. Paul test, which require consideration
of the questioned rule's jurisprudential establishment and the
amount or specificity of legislative revision.
The opinion rendered from the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Chance v. American Honda Motor Co. exemplifies the confusion
surrounding statutory classification.59 Here, the members of the
majority opinion agreed upon the final legislative classification,
but the Justices reached the conclusion by using different
methods. Justice Marcus used a jurisprudential definition of
substantive law to classify the law,6 1 while Justice Hall considered
the constitutionality of disturbing vested rights as the appropriate
benchmark for classification. 62 One scholar offers this discrepancy
as proof that jurisprudential definitions are "profoundly malleable"
to the point that judges themselves cannot classify legislation with
certainty. 63
55. Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium
Approach, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1055, 1063 (1997).
56. Segura, 630 So. 2d at 724-25.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 635 So. 2d 177 (La. 1994).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 178.
62. Id. at 179-80.
63. Trahan, supra note 38, at 759.
2007] 609
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
The judicial response to classification problems has aided the
endeavor of accurate classification, but since no existing test is
universally applied, classification becomes unpredictable and
haphazard. One scholar expresses his exasperation and the
corresponding need for definitive scholarly response: "The
definitions that the courts have so far supplied for these terms are
indeterminate in the extreme and, still worse, even overlap to a
significant degree. As a result, predicting into which of these
categories the courts will place a particular law is not far from
outright gambling. 64
The recent upsurge in Louisiana Supreme Court opinions
dedicated specifically to the constitutional problems associated
with improper legislative classification also illustrates the
pertinence and timeliness of a consolidated sorting system.65 For
example, in the latest judicial statement on retroactivity from the
Louisiana Supreme Court, the court recognized that separation of
powers principles do not prevent the legislature from appropriately
using the interpretive exception to retroactivity. 66  However,
legislative abuse of the interpretive exception is explicitly
condemned.67 In light of current judicial acknowledgement, the
Louisiana legal community is primed for a classification remedy to
constitutional violations resulting from improper use of the
interpretive exception to retroactivity.
III. ANALYSIS
To substantively improve the existing classification techniques,
a new classification method should provide consistent results.
With a clearer differentiation between substantive and interpretive
legislation, fewer constitutional violations will occur.
64. Id. at 765.
65. See Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc. v. Kennedy, 914 So. 2d 533 (La. 2005);
Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr. v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales & Use Tax Comm'n, 903
So. 2d 1071 (La. 2005) (on rehearing); Unwired Telecom Corp. v. Parish of
Calcasieu, 903 So. 2d 392 (La. 2005) (on rehearing).




A. Optimal Characteristics of a Proposed Definition
The temporal effect of legislation hinges on its classification as
substantive or interpretive law. 68  The ultimate system of
legislative classification should blend the existing techniques into a
consistently utilized and concise hybrid.
1. Peripheral Issues of Definition Development
Defining the difference between substantive and interpretive
laws will require legislation. Jurisprudential tests are insufficient
because they are vulnerable to various interpretations.
Furthermore, jurisprudence is not a primary source of law in
Louisiana.69  Legislation and custom are primary sources of law
that impose binding authority; jurisprudence is a secondary source
of law that carries only persuasive authority.70 Although the
jurisprudential tests are not authoritatively binding, they were
created in a good faith effort to improve the existing (or rather non-
existent) methods of classification by establishing an equitable
standard.7 ' Ideally, the necessary definitions will appear in the
Louisiana Civil Code or Revised Statutes, thus carrying the
corresponding binding authority of a primary source of law.
Next, the creation of a sufficient classification system must
include an affirmative definition of interpretation that
independently determines interpretive status. While the present
criteria indicate whether a legislative enactment fails the
interpretive test, no device determines whether a law affirmatively
68. Id. at 543. See also William Reed Huguet, Hulin v. Fibreboard
Corp.-n Pursuit of a Workable Framework for Adjudicative Retroactivity
Analysis in Louisiana, 60 LA. L. REv. 1003, 1007 (2000).
69. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1 (2006).
70. Id. "Judicial opinions, although invaluable interpretations of the law,
are merely that; interpretations of the legislative will. The supreme expression
of legislative will in Louisiana is of course the codes and statutes." Winstead v.
Ed's Live Catfish & Seafood, 554 So. 2d 1237, 1242 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989),
writ denied, 558 So. 2d 570 (La. 1990).
71. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 4 (2006) ("When no rule for a particular
situation can be derived from legislation or custom, the court is bound to
proceed according to equity. To decide equitably, resort is made to justice,
reason, and prevailing usages.").
2007]
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passes the test. For instance, jurisprudential tests classify
interpretive laws as those that produce a non-substantive result.
72
As one scholar has noted, "To be sure of [the classification], of
course, one needs a list of sufficient conditions for
'interpretativeness.' Unless and until the courts or the legislature
come up with one, the interpretive-substantive boundary will
remain unfixed., 73  Accordingly, the definition should include
sufficient characteristics of interpretive legislation so that a law
can be definitively classified, and not merely deemed interpretive
by default.
2. Skeletal Requirements of Interpretive/Substantive
Classification System
Although scholars have recognized the need for a clear
statement of interpretive and substantive classification to correctly
apply temporal law, neither scholars nor judges have undertaken
the daunting development of a new test that can displace existing
tests with a concise, simple, yet sufficiently conclusive
classification scheme. 74 Clarification of the existing two-part test,
combined with an additional element considering constitutionality,
creates an improved classification scheme.75 As such, skeletal
requirements of the proposed scheme include the following: (1)
deference to express legislative intent about a law's temporal
application; (2) judicial inference of legislation classification in the
absence of express legislative intent; and (3) safeguard of
constitutional principles, regardless of express or implied
legislative intent.
72. Trahan, supra note 38, at 761-62.
73. Id. at 762.
74. See generally Trahan, supra note 38.
75. Since a definition cannot be at once flexible and definitive, it is
impossible to create a perfect legislation classification scheme. However, the
system produced by this analysis improves the existing tests by providing clear
and constitutional, albeit imperfect, results.
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a. Express Legislative Intent for Temporal Application
When the legislature expresses an intended temporal
application, that intention should be applied.76 Typical expressions
of intent for temporal application specifically indicate whether the
act should receive prospective application only, or both
prospective and retroactive application.77  As the Louisiana
Supreme Court has recently stated, it is presumed that each word
of statutory language was chosen for a distinct purpose since the
legislature does not use words that are "redundant or useless."
78
Accordingly, statutory language should be read exactly as it is
written, giving each word its commonly understood syntax and
meaning. 79 Interpretation should be utilized as a secondary method
of understanding legislative intent.
80
b. Judicial Classification of Interpretive and Substantive
Legislation When the Legislative Intent is Indeterminable
Although judicial interpretation is only necessary when the
plain meaning of statutory text does not reveal clear legislative
intent or leads to ambiguous results,8 ' interpretation of legislative
intent is also required when the legislature does not give any
76. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 6 (2006); State v. Washington, 830 So. 2d 288,
290 (La. 2002).
77. For example, in Cole v. Celotex Corp., the court referred to the
following statement as a "clear and unmistakable" expression of legislative
intent for prospective application: "The provisions of this act shall not apply to
claims arising from events that occurred prior to the time this act becomes
effective." 599 So. 2d 1058, 1064 (La. 1992).
78. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc. v. Kennedy, 914 So. 2d 533, 546 (La. 2005)
(citing ABL Mgmt., Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors of Southern Univ., 773 So. 2d
131, 135 (La. 2000)).
79. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 11 (2006) ("The words of a law must be given
their generally prevailing meaning.").
80. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 9 (2006) ("When a law is clear and
unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law
shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search
of the intent of the legislature.").
81. The principle is based on the Latin maxim of statutory interpretation,
interpretatio cessat in claris: there is no need for interpretation when the text is
clear.
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statement of its temporal intention for the law.8 2 Since the various
jurisprudential tests currently available simply muddle legislative
categorization, classification will be simplified if definitive
measures are reduced to their essence.83 Thus, laws can be sorted
by examining a single characteristic: interpretive classification
should rely on clarification of original legislative intent, and
substantive classification should depend on creation or alteration of
existing rights.
To achieve its purpose, scholars explain that an ideal definition
will "settle on a single ... criterion for retroactivity. Maintaining
multiple definitions of the term (as the courts now unwittingly do)
not only is intellectually sloppy, but also breeds uncertainty. 84
Establishment of a new system is admittedly complicated and
lofty. However, such efforts are necessary to untangle the
insufficient methods available and to mollify their resulting
problems.
i. Interpretive Legislation: Problems in Clarifying Original
Legislative Intent
A panoply of cases and scholars finds that interpretive
legislation corrects the law to reflect the original legislative
intention and true meaning of a law without impermissible creation
or alteration of rights.85 Determination of the legislature's original
intention, however, becomes problematic when the legislative
members have changed since the law was enacted. 86  While
82. Pierce v. Hobart Corp., 939 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1991).
83. As discussed supra Part II.C.2, the St. Paul court formulated factors to
aid legislative classification. However, these factors do not all apply to
interpretive or substantive classification since two factors really identify fairness
considerations. See infra Part III.A.2.b.iii. The existing factors provide the
basis of a new test that identifies the steps to accurate and constitutional
classification.
84. Trahan, supra note 38, at 766.
85. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609 So. 2d 809, 817 (La.
1992); Ardoin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1338 (La.
1978); Planiol, supra note 12; A.N. Yiannopoulos, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
SYSTEM 196 (2d ed. 1999).
86. Paul Roubier, LE DRorr TRANSrrOiRE 245-63 (J.-R. Trahan trans., 2d
ed. 1960) ("[H]ow, in the modem legislative regime, where the law is the work
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preparatory works in the legislative history are helpful guides to
legislative intention at the time of enactment, such sources are
sometimes unreliable and inconclusive since votes are also
influenced by unknown sources of self-interest or legislative
logrolling.
88
Judicial application of a uniform test will render results that are
less partial and more consistent. Accordingly, two of the four
factors established in St. Paul can be used to recognize original
legislative intention when the legislature has not affirmatively
expressed intended temporal application. For example, the first
prong of the St. Paul test considers the timing of the legislative
response. 89 This factor illuminates original legislative intent since
only a prompt response can indicate clarification of the original
meaning of the law. A prolonged period of time, on the other
hand, would result in new members of the legislature with different
personal and political agendas who are less likely to incant
"original legislative intent." Similarly, when an error is made,
conscientious parties make vigilant efforts to quickly fix the
problem. If an error remains untended for a period of time,'sudden
desire to remedy the mistake suggests the development of an
ulterior motive for revision that would not have been delayed if the
party was motivated by portrayal of original legislative intent.
Thus, swift legislative response suggests a good faith effort to
clarify original legislative intent; lengthy periods of inaction before
response is mobilized smack of alternative revision motives.
Similarly, the fourth prong of the St. Paul test also helps
discover original legislative intent by considering the amount of
of numerous assemblies whose membership is frequently renewed, can the
legislative power pretend that it alone has a lock on the true interpretation of the
law?"). But see generally Antonin Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Princeton Univ. Press 1997).
87. Theriot v. Midland Risk Ins. Co., 694 So. 2d 184, 186 (La. 1997)
(declaring legislative history to be a "particularly helpful guide in ascertaining
the intent of the legislature").
88. Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court's Declining Reliance on
Legislative History: The Impact of Justice Scalia's Critique, 36 HARv. J. ON
LEGIS. 369 (1999).
89. St. Paul, 609 So. 2d at 820.
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legislation in the revision.90 If the legislature truly intends to
correct interpretation to reflect original legislative intent, such
corrections will most likely be made on a situational basis with
attention devoted to the detailed application of the particular law.
Conversely, blanket revision of an entire section reflects
substantive change in the law. It is unlikely that an entire section
of legislation will be simultaneously misinterpreted to require mass
revision, which will then enable each law in the section to
concurrently portray original legislative intent. Thus, correction of
a single law indicates interpretation of original legislative intent,
while substantial revision suggests the intent to change substantive
law.
ii. Substantive Legislation: Creating, Impermissibly Altering,
or Destroying Rights
To encompass the definition of substantive laws, the Louisiana
Supreme Court has stated: "'Substantive laws,' for purposes of
determining whether a law should be applied retroactively, are
those which establish new rules, rights, and duties, or change
existing ones."9 1  Thus, any law that creates a new right is
automatically substantive and should only receive prospective
application. New rights are created when the obligations
associated with an existing right are changed. Although the
alteration of rights can constitute substantive law, it is more
difficult, depending on the nature of the change, to classify
legislation based on mere alteration. Louisiana courts determine
whether a right has been impermissibly altered by applying a test
based on vested rights.92 However, the application of this test is
problematic since the term "vested right" receives variable
interpretation.93
90. Id. at 820-21.
91. Anderson v. Avondale Indus., 798 So. 2d 93, 97 (La. 2001).
92. McCreary, supra note 24, at 1324-25.
93. Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 TEX. L. REv. 231,
246 (1927) (illustrating the variance in jurisprudential treatment of vested
rights); Michael A. Cancienne, Note, Smith v. LASERS: The Louisiana
Supreme Court Adjusts a Legislative Miscalculation, 65 LA. L. REv. 881, 898-
901 (2005) (discussing the faulty application of vested rights).
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Courts explain the vesting process as follows: "When a party
acquires a right to assert a cause of action prior to a change in the
law, that right is a vested pro ty right which is protected by the
guarantee of due process. ' 9  In Louisiana, a cause of action
accrues when the party has the right to initiate a lawsuit.95 Thus,
from the moment a party may sue in protection of his violated
right, the cause of action has accrued and his right has become
vested.
Vested rights, which create substantive law, are distinguished
from expectant rights, which can be retroactively destroyed by
subsequent legislation.96 For example, the right to own public
property does not vest until a proper survey is conducted; 97 the
right to inherit from a will does not vest until the decedent has
died.98 In short, vested rights are fully realized and exercisable,
while expectant rights are those that will be realized in the future,
but are not yet exercisable.
99
Finally, what amount of change in rights constitutes an
impermissible alteration? The United States Supreme Court has
defined the alteration of vested rights as attaching new legal
consequences to behavior completed before the law is enacted. 00
The Louisiana Supreme Court has ruled that a change in the
manner of exercise may not impermissibly alter a vested right.' 0'
The court determined that vested rights were not altered since the
legislative amendment only changed the order of recovery from
insurance defendants, not the general right to recover at all.1
0 2
Thus, retroactive application of a law that actually alters existing
94. Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 783 So. 2d 1251, 1259 (La. 2001).
95. Id. (citing Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058, 1063 (La.1992)).
96. Yiannopoulos, supra note 85, at 196.
97. Smith, supra note 93, at 245 (citing White v. Martin, 66 Tex. 340
(1886); Milam County v. Blake, 54 Tex. 169 (1880); Milam County v. Bateman,
54 Tex. 153 (1880); Wright v. Hawkins, 28 Tex. 452 (1866)) (explaining that
"the location of public lands is immune to retroactive deprivation after a survey
but not before").
98. McCreary, supra note 24, at 1325 n.15 (explaining that until the
moment the testator dies, any inheritance rights are mere expectancies).
99. Id. at 1325.
100. Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 269,269-70 (1994).
101. Segura v. Frank, 630 So. 2d 714, 723-24 (La. 1994).
102. Id.
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rights, rather than merely changing the manner of exercise, violates
due process since consequences are attached to behavior without
sufficient notice.1
0 3
iii. Exceptions to the Interpretive Exception
Although the interpretive exception allows retroactive
application in specific circumstances, this application is not always
desirable. Civilian scholars recognize that retroactivity rules
cannot be absolute since the most equitable application considers
the personal circumstances of the parties of each case. °4 When
retroactive application of an otherwise eligible piece of interpretive
legislation is unfair, the law should receive prospective application
instead. 0
5
For example, upon rehearing of Willis-Knighton Medical
Center v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales and Use Tax Commission, the
court found that retrospective application of a judicial opinion,'0 6
which changed the test used to determine component parts of
immovables, imposed unwarranted inequity upon individuals who
relied on the old test.' 0 7  The court explained that retroactive
application particularly hinders the affected legal field-property
law-since property law is an area in which "predictability and
stability [are] particularly important."'0 8 The Louisiana Supreme
103. See infra Part III.C.3.
104. Murchison & Trahan, supra note 28, at 209-10 (citing Eduardo Garcia
Miynez, INTRODUCTION AL ESTUDIO DEL DERECHO 388-90 (J.-R. Trahan trans.,
1996) (38th ed. 1986)).
105. Fisch, supra note 55, at 1084-87. Fairness considerations are usually
based on the protection of settled law and justified reliance on that law. Id. at
1085.
106. As a secondary source of authority, a different set of factors measures
the temporal application of judicial opinions. These factors are delineated in
Lovell v. Lovell, 378 So. 2d 418, 421-22 (La. 1979).
107. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr. v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales & Use Tax
Comm'n, 903 So. 2d 1071, 1107-08 (La. 2005) (on rehearing) (defining a
component part by the degree of attachment rather than societal expectations).
108. Willis-Knighton, 903 So. 2d at 1108. Property law requires special
stability since it is the foundation of almost all other rights; substantive
retroactive changes immediately disrupt the individual's property rights and
eventually disturb the entire economy. Id.
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Court also considered fairness factors in Tullier v. Tullier.10 9
Before applying article 2340, concerning the presumption of
community property in a matrimonial regime, the court considered
whether the retroactive application of the article would be fair to
the plaintiff wife." 0 These decisions illustrate the importance of
fairness factors in classification determination.
Repeated jurisprudential enforcement settles law and increases
reliance upon the law." 1 Relied-upon principles should not be
reversed and applied retroactively because established reliance on
a law should be fairly considered before a different interpretation
of the law applies retroactively. 112  Accordingly, the settled
jurisprudence prong (second) and the reliance prong (third) of the
St. Paul test should be incorporated into the analysis so as to
temper any definitive findings of legislative classification with
individualized fairness.
1 13
Legislative enactments are not subject to fairness
considerations since the legislative branch has the absolute
authority to make law."14  However, the fairness considerations
should be used as an extra safeguard when the judicial branch is
forced to classify legislation. Nevertheless, classification by either
the legislative or judicial branch must comport with constitutional
principles. 115
While weighing the unique circumstances of a case before
rendering a decision produces the most just result, customized
109. 464 So. 2d 278 (La. 1985).
110. Id. at283.
111. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609 So. 2d 809, 820 (La.
1992).
112. Fisch, supra note 55, at 1086. "Reliance depends upon the nature of the
rule, the clarity and predictability of the law prior to the adoption of the new
rule, the relative extent to which expectations about the rule affected the primary
conduct to which the rule applies, and the degree to which these expectations
were reasonable." Id. (citing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07
(1971)).
113. St. Paul, 609 So. 2d at 820-21.
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; LA. CONST. art. III, § 1.
115. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land and preempts any laws
that breach its principles. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. Thus, a law cannot be
applied retroactively, despite legislative intention reserved by article 6, if that
application violates constitutional principles.
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analysis is problematic since it lends itself to inconsistency.
Despite the convenient advantages promoted by bright-line tests, " 6
fairness considerations depend on the facts of the individual
circumstances and do not fit neatly into a classification scheme.
Though it is impossible to create a system that is perfectly accurate
and fact-conscious, an improved classification scheme will strive
for consistent and constitutional results that are tempered by
fairness considerations when necessary.
c. Constitutional Considerations: Adding a New Ingredient to
the Analysis
Classification according to legislative intent seems simple, but
only superficially so. Unfortunately, legislative intent as to
temporal application does not always comply with constitutional
principles. Academic doctrine recognizes that "[a]lthough the
legislature is free to express (or not express) intent regarding
prospective or retroactive application of an enactment, such
expressions cannot usurp the judicial function of interpreting the
law, nor can such expressions trump constitutional considerations
that prevent application in a fact-specific context.""' 17
Recent Louisiana Supreme Court decisions place the
interpretive exception under the judicial microscope. In 2005, the
court addressed the import of effects caused by retroactive
classification in three major decisions. 1 8  According to these
rulings, the legislature may not re-interpret a law once the judiciary
has rendered an authoritative interpretation. 1 9 This heavy-handed
approach drastically limits legislative use of the interpretive
exception to retroactivity and illustrates the court's intent to curtail
constitutional violations committed when the legislature dresses-up
116. As discussed in this comment, a clearly defined classification scheme
prevents separation of powers violations.
117. Lamonica&Jones, supranote 11, at § 6.4, at 113, 116.
118. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc. v. Kennedy, 914 So. 2d 533 (La. 2005);
Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr. v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales & Use Tax Comm'n, 903
So. 2d 1071 (La. 2005) (on rehearing); Unwired Telecom Corp. v. Parish of
Calcasieu, 903 So. 2d 392 (La. 2005) (on rehearing).
119. Mallard Bay Drilling, 914 So. 2d at 544 ("Such legislation effectively




substantive legislation under an interpretive guise to receive
retroactive application.
If retroactive application of a law allows the legislature to
usurp judicial power by adjudicating a case via legislative
interpretation, the law should be applied prospectively to avoid a
separation of powers violation.' 20 This principle is illustrated in
Unwired Telecom Corp. v. Parish of Calcasieu, where a cell phone
service provider filed a petition for recovery of sales and use
taxes. 12 1 While the appeals were pending, legislation amended the
provisions by redefining the terms "retail sale," "sales price," and
"use.' 22 Since the legislative amendment extinguished Unwired
Telecom's existing tax obligations by redefining the terms on
which the obligations were based, the enactment was an
unconstitutional attempt to disguise substantive law as interpretive
legislation. 123  The Unwired Telecom court was particularly
offended by the targeted legislative response to a specific appellate
decision that had already interpreted the terms; the legislation was
clearly amended to legislatively overrule the underlying case. 124 In
response to the unconstitutional appropriation of judicial power,
the court declared: "[I]t is not within the province of the
Legislature to interpret legislation after the judiciary has already
done So.' ' 12 5  This proclamation marks the beginning of a
boundary-enforcement approach to preventing constitutional
violations.
In the wake of Unwired Telecom, legislative authority to
exercise the interpretive exception to retroactivity appears to be
limited to "virgin" statutes that have not received prior judicial
interpretation. Upon rehearing of Willis-Knighton, the court found
that retrospective application of the judicial opinion overturning
the original test used to classify component parts of immovables in
120. Unwired Telecom, 903 So. 2d at 406.
121. Id. at 396-97.
122. Id. at 397.
123. Id. at 405-06.
124. Id. at 404-06 ("By passing [the act] in order to abrogate the appellate
court's interpretation and application of a long-standing revised statute, the
Legislature clearly assumed a function more properly entrusted to the judicial
branch of government.").
125. Id. at 405.
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favor of another test imposed unwarranted inequity upon
individuals who relied on the original test.' 26  Since this case
involved the retroactive application of a judicial decision, rather
than legislation, its details are not directly applicable. However,
the concern for correct retroactive application notably reappears on
the Louisiana Supreme Court docket.
The court continued to emphasize the progression toward strict
constitutional compliance by refusing to retroactively apply
legislative amendments in conflict with prior judicial decisions.' 27
In Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc. v. Kennedy, a drilling company
received a tax refund for the purchase of diesel fuel for their tug
boats under the sales tax exemption for owners of ships and vessels
on the basis that imposition of the tax would unconstitutionally
burden interstate commerce.' 28  The application of the tax
exception to the drilling company was based upon a legislative
amendment redefining interstate commerce to include tugboat
operation. However, the amendment was enacted in response to a
contrary judicial ruling which did not allow the exemption for
tugboat operators since those vessels never left state waters.
29
Thus, the court concluded that the legislative amendment of a law
in direct conflict with a reaffirmed judicial interpretation violates
separation of powers.'30 Although compliance with separation of
powers principles does not completely preclude the legislature
from exercising the interpretive exception to retroactivity,' 3' the
legislature's interpretive powers are restricted to "clarifying the
meaning of previously enacted texts outside the context of
litigation. 132 The narrow scope of exercisable power does not
126. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr. v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales & Use Tax
Comm'n, 903 So. 2d 1071, 1107-08 (La. 2005) (on rehearing) (defining a
component part by the degree of attachment to the immovable, rather than by
societal expectations).
127. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc. v. Kennedy, 914 So. 2d 533 (La. 2005).
128. Id. at 537-38.
129. Id. at 539-40. The court found that the tax exemption did not apply
based on the inapplicability of the legislative amendment (Act 40) and the fact
that Mallard's drilling barges cannot be classified as either ships or vessels in
order to qualify for the exception. Id.
130. Id. at 544-45.




allow the legislature to interpret a law already interpreted by the
judiciary. and reaffirmed without ambiguity. 133
Retroactive application of interpretive legislation continues to
be a prevalent issue in the Louisiana courts, frustrating scholars
and judicial figures in search of correct configuration and
application of a categorical determination. However, in Mallard
Bay Drilling, the court recognized the necessary fact that the
existing two-part classification test should be modified when the
result violates constitutional principles. 134  Thus, Louisiana is
ready for a properly codified classification system that improves
the existing schemes by: (1) clarifying the appropriate division
between laws that receive the interpretive exception; and (2)
preventing constitutional violations.
B. Finding a Solution: Proposed Classification Scheme and
Temporal Effect
This analysis sets forth an affirmative definition that
consolidates the existing jurisprudential tests into a single body,
providing clearer categorization and more equitable results. The
first two steps of the analysis are derived from existing
jurisprudential and doctrinal sources. However, the third step
provides a response to the recent trends in retroactivity
disseminated from the Louisiana Supreme Court.
1. Did the legislature express its intention regarding
temporal application?
If there is an expressed legislative intention,
proceed to step three.
2. If there is no expressed legislative intention, the law
should be judicially classified as interpretive or
substantive.
a. Interpretive legislation clarifies the original
meaning of the law.
* This legislation receives prospective and
retroactive application.
b. Substantive legislation establishes new rules,
133. Id.
134. Id. at 543.
2007] 623
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
changes existing rules, or extinguishes existing rules.
* This legislation receives prospective application
only.
c. Fairness exception to the interpretive exception: Is
the law justifiably relied upon such that retroactive
application unfairly upsets settledjurisprudence?
* The above determination should be weighed
against the effects it would cause and should only
be applied if it is fair and equitable.
3. Does adherence to the expressed legislative intention or
judicial classification violate constitutional principles?
a. Separation of powers principles are violated when
the legislature assumes a judicial role.
b. Due process notice requirements are violated by
retroactive application of a law that alters existing
obligations.
In the scope of this analysis, it is interesting to consider
whether the actual definition of temporal application will be
applied prospectively or retroactively. Here, the proposed
legislation is a definition of interpretive and substantive legislation
intended to aid temporal assignment. Necessarily, the definition
concisely synthesizes existing jurisprudential tests. 135  This
synthesis changes the existing law by sifting through the current
tests and using their separate parts to create a new whole.
However, as the Louisiana Supreme Court explains,
jurisprudentially-created rules cannot create substantive rights
since they are not primary sources of law.136 The court says that
"decisions of our state courts do not create or eliminate substantive
rights as this is the proper function of the legislature."' 137 Since
"[t]he sources of law are legislation and custom,"' 38 and here, only
jurisprudential tests were altered, the new classification scheme
does not create or alter substantive law, so it can be applied
retroactively.
135. See Trahan, supra note 38, at 766 (emphasizing that an effective
definition must settle on a single set of criteria for retroactivity).
136. Tullier v. Tullier, 464 So. 2d 278, 282 (La. 1985).
137. Id.
138. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 (2006).
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To explain, the classification scheme itself is interpretive
legislation since it clarifies ambiguity in the existing field of
legislation and jurisprudence without altering existing substantive
rights. 139 Since the judicial tests that were altered in the course of
creating a definition were not capable of creating substantive
rights, 140 the new definition has not impermissibly created or
altered existing rights. As a result, if the legislature adopts this
proposed definition, retroactive application is permissible.
C. Impact: The Aftermath of a Classification Revolution
In direct contrast to traditional accommodating measures,
14
recent statements of the Louisiana Supreme Court have stifled the
interpretive exception by limiting its use to instances where the
judiciary has not already pronounced its own interpretation. 142
This 180 degree revolution is likely a reflection of increased
instances of improper use of the interpretive exception. If
constitutional principles are not respected, the court might further
limit the exception such that its niche in Louisiana jurisdictions
fades away. Thus, compliance with constitutional tenets is more
important than ever; the new classification scheme aids correct and
constitutional application of the interpretive exception.
A distinction between interpretive and substantive legislation
will trickle down to individual applications of law and percolate up
to the fundamental governmental branches. Since the temporal
effects of law simultaneously impact individual persons whose
fates can depend on statutory classification, as well as the
separation of powers between the judicial and legislative branches,
the peripheral effects of definitive classification will have
enormous consequences. Correct classification (1) fosters the
139. Tullier, 464 So. 2d at 283.
140. Id. at 282.
141. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 609 So. 2d 809, 817-22 (La.
1992) (dedicating considerable effort to creating a five-factor test to classify
legislation).
142. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc. v. Kennedy, 914 So. 2d 533 (La. 2005);
Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr. v. Caddo-Shreveport Sales & Use Tax Comm'n, 903
So. 2d 1071 (La. 2005) (on rehearing); Unwired Telecom Corp. v. Parish of
Calcasieu, 903 So. 2d 392 (La. 2005) (on rehearing).
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legislature's integrity, (2) prevents the disappearance of the
civilian notion of the interpretive exception, and (3) protects the
branches from inappropriate appropriation of power.
1. Protecting the Legislature from Itself
A clarified standard prevents separation of powers violations
by accurate legislative classification. A standardized method of
classification allows the legislature to assign the proper temporal
effect to legislation. As a result, laws receive greater judicial
deference because a universal standard lessens the need for judicial
scrutiny. Increasingly accurate legislative proclamations teamed
with a resulting upsurge in judicial deference reflect the
recognition of legislative integrity. The judicial branch
acknowledges that "[t]his judicial deference to legislative
discretion in the enactment of laws . . . is a cornerstone of the
doctrine of separation of powers."'' 43  When a component of a
whole is strengthened, the entire body benefits from the isolated
improvement. Accordingly, a precise statement of retroactive
criteria will immediately impact the legislative branch and will
ultimately cause far-reaching effects.
2. Reviving the Civilian Tradition
Recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court has disseminated
opinions that subject the interpretive exception to serious
accusations of unconstitutional application, thereby threatening its
continued existence. '" Although the embers of disapproval have
smoldered for years, the recent opinions have reignited the debate.
When appropriately used, interpretive legislation provides the
legislature with the unique opportunity to "pronounce the 'correct'
interpretation to be given to existing laws.' 45  As a correct
pronouncement of law, retroactive interpretive legislation remedies
malfunction--it does not impermissibly create new rights or alter
143. Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 399 So. 2d 1179, 1182 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1981).
144. Willis-Knighton, 903 So. 2d at 1109; Unwired Telecom, 903 So. 2d at
404-06.
145. Pierce v. Hobart Corp., 939 F.2d 1305, 1309 (5th Cir. 1991).
626 [Vol. 67
COMMENTS
existing rights. 146 Clarification would likely placate critics who
oppose the exception, thus reinstating a pillar of the Louisiana
civilian tradition.
14 7
3. Protecting Constitutional Principles
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the
constitutional implications of retroactivity, but has never fully
confronted and defined the ramifications of the controversial
temporal doctrine. 148  Opponents justifiably complain that the
interpretive exception creates opportunities for separation of
powers violations. 149 These loopholes are closed by a clarified
standard of legislative classification. Principles affected by a
refined definition include the following: (1) equal protection of the
law; (2) the due process notice requirement; and (3) prohibitions
against vague statutory language.
a. Equal Protection Requires Equal Application of Law
Although the judicial role is inherently interpretive,' 50 judicial
interpretations should correlate so that different judges reach the
same conclusion under a specific set of facts. A clearer definition
146. Terrebonne v. S. Lafourche Tidal Control Levee Dist., 445 So. 2d 1221,
1225 (La. 1984).
147. The interpretive exception traced back to 1789 in post-revolution
France; the exception was introduced into Louisiana law via the heavy French
influence on the Louisiana Civil Code. See supra Part II.B.
148. Fisch, supra note 55, at 1073.
149. H. Alston Johnson, Legislation-Procedure and Interpretation, 45 LA.
L. REv. 341, 344 (1984) ("There is serious doubt about the validity of this
exception in any event.., because an 'interpretive' enactment begins to give the
legislature judicial power."). See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317
So. 2d 576, 590 (La. 1975) (on rehearing) (arguing that the exception is
"unconstitutional because it is a legislative usurpation of judicial power to
interpret legislation").
150. See U.S. CONST. art. III; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of
necessity expound and interpret that rule."); Bacon, supra note 10, at 265
("Judges ought to remember that their office is jus dicere, and not jus dare; to
interpret law, and not to make law, or give law.").
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effects equal protection of law since universal criteria for
interpretive legislation affords equal application of law and
prevents individualized judicial interpretations which, albeit
learned and well-intended, are personalized by each judge. 151
Touting this lofty principle in respect to temporal application of
law may seem self-important or overreaching, but fundamental
elements of American government cannot be ignored. Since the
beginning of legal history, courts have found that "[t]he very
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury."' 52 When a party accepts an adverse judgment,
despite similar cases reaching favorable results, the disfavored
party is injured by inconsistent interpretations of the same law.
The application of elementary justice principles emphasizes the
scope of impact for appropriate distinction between interpretive
and substantive legislation and the corresponding temporal effect.
b. Classification Effects on the Notice Requirement
The Due Process Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions
limit the legislative power to make laws.' 53 Constitutional tenets
of due process impose a notice requirement; 154 in compliance
therewith, one must receive fair notice of conduct deserving
punishment and the severity of the penalty that may be imposed. 5
151. The need for consistency is not intended to undermine judicial creativity
as a crucial component of justice. Some scholars rebuke the notion that the
judicial role should be confined to strict interpretation. See Huguet, supra note
68, at 1032 ("Misled by Francis Bacon's half-truth, 'Judges ought to remember
that their office is . . . to interpret law, and not to make law' and by several
generations of oversimplifying high school civics teachers, multitudes of our
citizenry have come to believe that it is somehow improper for judges to admit
to law-innovation, law-choice, or law-revision . . . . If the courts will not
perform this duty, the legislatures cannot-and the reasoned development of the
law and its ability to serve current needs must suffer.").
152. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163.
153. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; LA. CONST. art.
I, § 2.
154. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; LA. CONST. art.
I, § 2.
155. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)
(noting that a fundamental element of due process "is notice reasonably
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A scholar expounds: "[F]air retroactivity rules should provide
notice of applicable standards and protect reliance interests ....
The justice of a legal system is what gives its rules legitimacy.
Notice enables people to predict the consequences of their
transactions and increases the influence of legal rules upon primary
conduct."' 56 Respect for the notice requirement of due process
supports a definitive classification of legislation so that true
substantive legislation will not receive haphazard retroactive
application under the guise of interpretive designation.
c. Vague Statutory Language Inhibits Proper Notice
A person should not be subjected to a law that could be
unintentionally violated--if an intelligent person must guess a
law's meaning, imposition of liability for its breach is unjust. The
Supreme Court of the United States has determined that "[a] law is
unconstitutionally vague if its lack of definitive standards either (1)
fails to apprise persons of ordinary intelligence of the prohibited
conduct, or (2) encourages arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement."' 57  Vague statutes violate the fair notice
requirements since they do not clearly state legal parameters.
58
Interpretive legislation ameliorates vague statutory language by
resolving ambiguity. 159  Accordingly, retroactive application of
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections"); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914) (adding that notice must
convey all relevant and necessary information); Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398
(1900) (adding that notice must provide a reasonable time to enable proper
response).
156. Fisch, supra note 55, at 1084-85.
157. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 90 (1999).
158. See generally id. (finding that city may not order dispersal for gang
loitering without knowing if congregation had purpose); Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (finding that city cannot vaguely criminalize
vagrancy); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (finding that city
cannot vaguely prohibit more than three persons from assembling on a sidewalk
and exhibit annoying conduct).
159. Interpretive laws may replace vague statutory language with a specific
delineation of original legislative intent.
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interpretive law fosters constitutional principles since improperly
vague laws are clarified by the original legislative intention.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the law is definitively based on right and wrong, justice
hangs in the balance among the many shades of gray. Although a
clear-cut definition will prevent legislative abuse and judicial
inconsistency, it is not an instant cure capable of perfecting every
future legislative classification. The nature of the judicial process
requires judicial interpretation of law based on a judge's personal
conceptions of fairness. Diversity is a necessary component of
fairness: all judges do not form universally equivalent conclusions,
even on the same fact pattern. The Supreme Court recognizes this
proposition:
Indeed, the position that the courts must forgo any
examination of the individual case and focus exclusively on
the legality of the broader detention scheme cannot be
mandated by any reasonable view of separation of powers,
as this approach serves only to condense power into a
single branch of government.160
The judicial branch is not a machine that can or should produce
the same opinion from every judge. As humans, judges each
receive conscious and unconscious influences from innumerable
sources, not just a definition of legislative classification.16  A
uniform system of legislative classification should not aspire to
instantly fix all problems caused by interpretive or substantive
temporal application. Instead, clarification reduces ambiguity and
supplements theoretical and practical aspects of law: due process
160. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535-36 (2004) (addressing a citizen-
detainee's due process right to receive notification of the basis for enemy-
combatant classification and a fair opportunity to rebut classification before a
neutral decision maker).
161. Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human? Part One: The Effect on Legal
Thinking of the Assumption That Judges Behave Like Human Beings, 80 U. PA.
L. REv. 17, 24 (1931) (discussing the human variables that affect judicial
opinions); Eric L. Muller, Constitutional Conscience, 83 B.U. L. REv. 1017,
1038 ("Justices Black and Douglas implied that the guarantee of due process
was determined by what the judge ate for breakfast.").
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principles are furthered by easy legislation identification by
governmental bodies. In turn, the definitive result of the
classification analysis must be balanced with the ensuing results;
unjust consequences adulterate gains achieved through consistent
identification. If the interpretive exception to retroactivity is
abused or neglected, it becomes the problem child of temporal law.
However, if the exception is well-groomed and nurtured, it is a
vehicle for legislative improvement and a protector of
constitutional principles.
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